Half-way between UK and US
Everything that Tianyu Fang is talking about
Has China already won the internet?
- What the US gets wrong about TikTok: its nefarious goal isn’t to push ideology, but just to make a ton of money.
- China’s internet evolved as a massive shopping mall: the manufacturing boom and increased wealth happened at the same time that the internet was developed. The digital architecture developed to be commerce-first.
- The lack of space for free speech online reinforced this. If you can’t loudly voice opinions, then focus on endorphin rushes from shopping.
- TikTok is not competing with Instagram or YouTube; it’s competing with Amazon.
- Instagram and YouTube disrupted traditional media by creating content good enough to attract advertisers. ByteDance inverts the model: it builds platforms where ads themselves are designed to become culture, with the ultimate aim of converting that cultural weight into direct sales.
- 2015 as the final heyday of Chinese journalism – China kicked out American reporters in 2020 during COVID, in retaliation for Trump kicking out Chinese reporters the same year. Starting in 2020, a lot of the China reporting was being done in places like Taipei, Seoul, Hong Kong (to a lesser extent now), Singapore, and Washington DC.
- A former Financial Times reporter in Beijing used to say that there are three types of China stories. There’s Big China, Scary China, and Weird China….nowadays big and weird don’t really work anymore, so we’re getting a lot of scary China
- Ex: social credit system blown out of proportion – this system was based on an experimental pilot program for one small city in China…and they completely ditched it a few years later because nobody was using it and there was no real repercussions.
- This also ties to previous podcast episode which discusses how the implications of a credit system is different in China because everything is so commerce based. So having points is a bit like having bonus credits on Amazon
- Ex: social credit system blown out of proportion – this system was based on an experimental pilot program for one small city in China…and they completely ditched it a few years later because nobody was using it and there was no real repercussions.
- Americans tend to think that people on the Chinese web are either complicit with the government or actively resisting it. But actually, most people just don’t really care that much about the government, similar to how people in the US relate to national politics. Most people who use VPNs just want to see cat videos on Instagram
- “Here I’m reminded of how little these meta-narratives matter to the Chinese counterparts. The average Chinese tech entrepreneur compared to the Californian counterpart cares so much less about making utopia or dystopian technological futures and cares so much more about making raw profit in a hyper-competitive market.”
- Attribute part of this to VC-funding vs state funding model – “No one makes profit for a really long time. We all just have ideas. No one has a working product or more than one customer. So how do you differentiate yourself and show you’re the founder who’s gonna win? You got to have the most ambitious vision.”
The Rise of Techno-Nationalism
- In the 2000s, U.S. foreign policy discourse adopted a specific vision of the internet and cutting-edge technologies at large that celebrated its potential as a lever for spreading free expression, democratic values, and trade globally.
- Over the past decade, this has shifted dramatically. Driven by increasing tensions with China and greater skepticism towards technology at home, the U.S. has adopted a foreign policy vision for technology that is increasingly anchored by national security concerns, focused on zero-sum competition, and less committed to openness.
Munching on some Substack articles
The only thing worse than sweatshops is no sweatshops
- Since 1990, Bangladesh has more than quadrupled its living standards; Noah argues credit is due to the expansion of the garment industry
- “‘sweatshops are bad’ is just one of those things that American progressives are supposed to believe…This idea is partly rooted in a very reasonable disgust at the sort of working-conditions that prevail in sweatshops. But it also comes from two very old leftist notions. The first is the idea that factory owners unfairly exploit workers, who — according to Marx — ought to capture all of the value of what they produce. The second is the idea that the developed world — especially America and Europe — got rich by stealing resources from poor countries. The idea of sweatshops as a curse upon the global poor comes from the combination of these ideas — instead of stealing aluminum or diamonds, we’re stealing poor Bangladeshis’ labor, paying them wages far lower than what they deserve, and forcing them to destroy their health with poor working conditions.
- Countries get rich through either industrialization or oil, and the general evidence backs that sweatshops reduced poverty for locals. And evidence is mixed whether actions like mandating improved working conditions decreases job opportunities overall.
- “Of course, the way countries can retain jobs and improve wages and working conditions is to raise productivity”
- I totally believe this. Seen it up close in Indonesia – labor is sooo abundant and cheap, and firms continue relying on large amounts of low-cost workers rather than improving efficiency. Policies can encouragement investments in technology or organizational improvements
- Really interesting article, but would appreciate how a discussion of environmental degradation fits into all this. Perhaps this can be lumped into the “productivity” portion…that there is room for improved environmental considerations given the large potential productivity low hanging fruits in many of these settings
yixinsun.com 